Bank fraud: a customer’s gross negligence does not relieve the bank of its duty to refund

In this article, Margaux FRISQUE, Partner, and Léa SARFATI, Associate, in the Commercial Contracts and Litigation department, analyse the scope of the judgment delivered by the Court of Justice of the European Union on 15 October 2026, its consequences for banks’ refund obligations and the remedies available to victims of banking fraud.

When a customer falls victim to bank fraud, it is not uncommon for their bank to refuse a refund on the grounds that they disclosed their security credentials or approved a suspicious transaction. The bank then invokes “gross negligence” in order to make the customer bear the financial consequences of the fraud.

In a judgment of 15 October 2026 (C-70/25, Tukowiecka), the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) calls this practice into question, ruling that a customer’s gross negligence does not allow the bank to refuse the immediate refund of an unauthorised payment transaction. If the bank considers that its customer committed such a fault, it must first refund them, before it may, where appropriate, claim repayment of the sums paid.

This decision significantly shifts the balance of banking litigation, without however guaranteeing final compensation to every fraud victim.

Gross negligence is no bar to an immediate refund

EU payment services law, derived from Directive (EU) 2015/2366, known as PSD2, rests on two complementary mechanisms.

First, Article 73 of the Directive, transposed into Article L. 133-18 of the French Monetary and Financial Code (Code monétaire et financier), requires the bank to refund any unauthorised transaction immediately after being notified of it and, at the latest, by the end of the following business day.

Second, Article 74 of the Directive, transposed into Article L. 133-19 of the same Code, provides that the customer may bear the losses resulting, in particular, from an intentional or grossly negligent failure to comply with their security obligations.

The difficulty lay in how these provisions fit together. Some banks regarded gross negligence as an exception to their refund obligation and relied on it to refuse their customers’ claims outright.

The CJEU rejects this interpretation by distinguishing the obligation to refund immediately from the final allocation of losses. The bank therefore cannot refuse to re-credit the account solely because it considers its customer to have been grossly negligent. It nevertheless retains the possibility of subsequently claiming repayment, through the appropriate legal channels, provided that it proves the fault alleged.

Only where there are reasonable grounds to suspect fraud by the customer themselves may the refund be deferred, provided that those grounds are communicated in writing to the Banque de France, in accordance with Article L. 133-18 of the Monetary and Financial Code.

A shift in the balance of power between bank and customer

Beyond clarifying the legislation, the judgment changes the way in which disputes over unauthorised transactions are brought. Whereas victims were often forced to go to court to challenge a refusal based on their alleged gross negligence, it is now for the bank, once it has complied with its refund obligation, to take the necessary steps if it intends to make the customer bear the loss definitively.

This development comes with significant evidentiary requirements. Article L. 133-23 of the Monetary and Financial Code specifies that the use of the payment instrument, as recorded by the bank, is not necessarily sufficient in itself to establish that the customer authorised the transaction or acted with gross negligence. Furthermore, where the bank did not require strong customer authentication, Article L. 133-19, V of the same Code provides that the customer bears, in principle, no loss, unless they acted fraudulently.

Failure to comply with the refund obligation also exposes the bank to the penalties laid down in Article L. 133-18 of the Monetary and Financial Code. Sums due bear interest at the statutory rate plus five percentage points, rising to ten points beyond seven days’ delay and fifteen points beyond thirty days.

Finally, this interpretation may be relied upon in pending disputes, including where the refusal to refund predates the judgment, subject to the applicable time limits and to decisions that have become final.

Protection limited to unauthorised transactions

This solution does not, however, benefit all fraud victims indiscriminately. It applies only where the disputed transaction qualifies as unauthorised, that is to say executed without the payer’s consent, within the meaning of Article L. 133-6 of the Monetary and Financial Code.

This may be the case where a fraudster uses banking credentials stolen through phishing to carry out a transfer themselves.

The position is different where the victim personally ordered the transfer of funds, for instance to a fake investment platform. Even though they were deceived as to the destination or use of their money, the payment remains, in principle, authorised and falls outside the refund mechanism provided for in Article L. 133-18.

That said, the absence of a right to a refund on this basis does not rule out all action against the bank. Its contractual liability may be engaged, in particular, where it fails in its duty of vigilance in the face of apparent anomalies affecting the transactions carried out, notwithstanding the principle of non-interference in its customer’s affairs. Such an action, however, requires proof of a breach attributable to the bank and of a loss caused by that breach, and any fault on the customer’s part may also be taken into account.

Bank adviser impersonation scams are a particularly clear illustration of why this distinction matters. Where a fraudster poses as a bank adviser and persuades the customer to approve a transaction presented as a way of blocking a suspicious payment, the question arises whether the customer actually consented to the disputed transfer.

The answer requires a detailed analysis of the circumstances of the fraud, of how the transaction was approved and of the information actually brought to the payer’s attention. The mere use of an authentication device is not necessarily sufficient to establish that the payer authorised the payment.

The characterisation of the transaction is therefore an essential prerequisite to any action against the bank, since it determines the applicable liability regime and the remedies that may be pursued.

What remedies are available to victims of bank fraud?

A victim of bank fraud should block their payment instrument where necessary and report the disputed transaction to their bank without delay, preferably in writing, and then file a criminal complaint. For unauthorised transactions, Article L. 133-24 of the Monetary and Financial Code provides, in principle, a maximum period of thirteen months from the debit date, failing which the claim is time-barred.

Where the bank refuses a refund on grounds of gross negligence, the Tukowiecka judgment now provides an additional basis for demanding compliance with Article L. 133-18 and, where appropriate, for claiming the late-payment penalties provided for in that article.

If the refusal persists, a referral to the banking ombudsman (médiateur bancaire), which is free of charge, may precede legal proceedings.

The firm d&a partners assists victims of banking fraud in analysing their situation and pursuing the appropriate remedies, from challenging a refusal to refund to bringing a liability claim against their bank.

MIDAS, ESMA’s tool against market abuse that changes day-to-day operations for CASPs

In this article, Daniel ARROCHE, Partner at d&a partners, presents MIDAS, ESMA’s surveillance system for crypto-asset markets, and what it means for crypto-asset service providers.

Are you a CASP preparing to submit your data to MIDAS? The law firm d&a partners can assist you.

Until now, a crypto-asset service provider authorized in the European Union had to keep records of its orders and transactions, and hand them over to its regulator upon request.

This is changing. That data will now leave the firm at regular intervals, in a set format, for a central system designed to detect market abuse.

On October 21, 2026, the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) published the reporting instructions for MIDAS, its central surveillance system for crypto-asset markets.

This technical document, seemingly meant for IT teams, in fact sets out a new architecture for market surveillance. Who must send what, who monitors, and what should providers anticipate?

From record keeping to a data feed

The MiCA Regulation governs, among others, crypto-asset service providers (CASPs), that is, firms authorized to provide clients with services such as operating a trading platform, exchanging crypto-assets for funds, executing orders, or receiving and transmitting orders.

Its Title VI prohibits market abuse involving crypto-assets: insider dealing, unlawful disclosure of inside information and market manipulation.

To support the detection of such abuse, MiCA does not provide, unlike the rules applicable to financial instruments, for systematic transaction reporting to the authorities.

First, it requires all CASPs to keep records of their services, activities, orders and transactions.

Second, it requires trading platforms to keep order data at the disposal of the authorities for at least five years.

Third, it gives national competent authorities the power to require any person to provide information and documents.

In other words, the framework relied on record keeping and disclosure upon request.

MIDAS turns this into a feed: CASPs must now send their data on a set schedule and in a set format, so that it can be screened by detection algorithms.

The comparison with investment firms comes naturally. They report their transactions in financial instruments to their regulator no later than the following working day, under MiFIR.

Who sends what, and how

The instructions distinguish between two data flows, identified by the reference of their message:

(1) executions data, which records executed transactions and must be submitted by all CASPs;

(2) order book data, which covers the full life cycle of orders (entry, modification, cancellation, partial or full execution) and must be submitted only by CASPs operating a trading platform, in addition to their executions data.

The mechanics are strictly standardized. Data is uploaded as JSON files to a dedicated secure access point (SFTP) every two weeks, although a different frequency may be agreed with ESMA’s technical provider and the national authorities.

Files go through three levels of checks, covering transmission, the file itself and its content. A file that does not follow the naming convention or the format is automatically rejected, and none of its records are processed.

Feedback files are placed in the CASP’s SFTP directory, normally within two hours of receipt, with no email notification.

A provider that does not read these feedback files may therefore believe it has met its obligations while part of its data has been rejected.

Onboarding takes place on a case-by-case basis. The CASP sends an onboarding request to ESMA’s MIDAS support team, runs tests in a dedicated environment, and its national competent authority then approves the move to production.

Regular submissions then start on a set date. There is therefore no common EU-wide start date.

Who monitors: ESMA detects, national authorities sanction

The document is explicit about the allocation of roles. It recalls that ESMA has no formal supervisory role under MiCA: national authorities remain responsible for supervision and enforcement.

They are the ones that collectively decided to centralize the technical capability to collect and analyze data. Through delegation agreements, they have entrusted ESMA with collecting, processing and quality-checking the data, as well as generating and distributing alerts.

The instructions do not, however, specify the number or the identity of the national authorities that have signed these agreements.

Personal data, the issue for the next phase

MIDAS is being rolled out in phases. The first phase excludes personal data, non-public CASP data, supervisory data and information related to investigations, such as suspicious transaction and order reports or requests for information.

Future phases may extend the scope to supervisory data, including personal identifiers, where supervision requires it.

ESMA’s 2027 work programme plans the roll-out of this second phase in the fourth quarter of 2027, subject to the approval of its Board.

The document does not specify whom these identifiers will relate to. If, as one might expect, they relate to CASPs’ clients, personal identifiers of investors from across the Union would be centralized in a single system.

This prospect calls for two observations. On the one hand, data protection requires that the necessity and proportionality of such centralization be justified.

On the other hand, the security of the system would itself become a market integrity issue: a database of this kind would be a prime target, at a time when data breaches regularly make the news.

What CASPs should anticipate

For providers, record keeping becomes a reporting chain in its own right, calling for an organization comparable to the one investment firms have set up for their transaction reporting.

In practice, several workstreams appear to require immediate attention:

(1) map executions data, and for platforms order book data, against the required fields and JSON format;

(2) set up the technical SFTP upload chain and organize testing with ESMA’s provider;

(3) appoint a person responsible for monitoring feedback files and corrections, failing which rejections could go unnoticed;

(4) document the arrangements in compliance and market abuse prevention procedures, and report on them to the management body;

(5) prepare now for the next phase, by anticipating the data protection questions raised by the transmission of personal identifiers.

Trading platforms are the most exposed, as their data volumes are on a different scale from those of other providers. But submitting executions data is mandatory for all CASPs.

A de facto Europeanization

MIDAS is part of a broader debate. The Market Integration and Supervision Package (MISP), proposed by the European Commission in December 2025, contemplated giving ESMA direct supervision of all CASPs.

Yet, without waiting for the outcome of these negotiations, the detection of market abuse involving crypto-assets is already being centralized at EU level, through the technical and contractual route of delegation agreements.

National authorities retain investigations and sanctions, but it is an EU tool that will generate the alerts that may trigger them.

Conclusion

Behind a technical document lies a change in the nature of CASPs’ obligations: passive record keeping is giving way to regular transmission, checked and analyzed by detection algorithms.

The firm advises CASPs on the analysis of these obligations and on the adaptation of their procedures.


Disclaimer. This article is published for general information purposes only. It reflects the texts and publications available as of October 28, 2026, and will not be updated. It does not constitute legal advice and does not create a lawyer-client relationship. Any specific situation requires an analysis based on its own facts. Neither d&a partners nor the author accepts any liability for decisions made solely on the basis of this article.

AML/CFT: the new European framework for regulated financial entities and the creation of AMLA

In this article, Daniel ARROCHE, Partner at d&a partners, presents the new European anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing framework: the entities in scope, supervision, the main changes to obligations and the timeline.

Are you an obliged entity looking to prepare the adaptation of your AML/CFT framework to the new European rules? The law firm d&a partners can assist you.

Key takeaways

The new framework covers all professionals subject to AML/CFT rules, not only crypto players. Banks, payment and electronic money institutions, investment firms, asset management companies, life insurers, crypto-asset service providers and certain non-financial professions will be governed by a single European regulation.

As from July 10, 2027, the AML/CFT obligations of obliged entities will be set out in a directly applicable European regulation. It will replace most of the rules of the French Monetary and Financial Code and will be supplemented by harmonized technical standards.

The new European authority, AMLA, will directly supervise only a limited number of financial players. From 2028, around 40 credit or financial institutions operating in at least six Member States. Other entities will remain supervised by national authorities.

The new obligations do not apply before July 10, 2027. Only the rules on information accompanying transfers of funds and crypto-assets already apply.

Applicable framework

The European anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing (“AML/CFT“) package, published on June 19, 2024, comprises three texts, in addition to a regulation that already applies:

TextPurposeApplication
Regulation (EU) 2024/1624 (“AMLR”)Obligations of obliged entities: internal organization, customer due diligence, beneficial ownership, suspicious transaction reporting, record-keeping.July 10, 2027 (Art. 90)
Directive (EU) 2024/1640 (“AMLD6”)Organization and powers of national supervisors, financial intelligence units, beneficial ownership registers, sanctions.Transposition for the most part “by 10 July 2027” (Art. 78)[1]
Regulation (EU) 2024/1620 (“AMLAR”)Establishment of the Authority for Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism (“AMLA“).Direct supervision from 2028, limited to around 40 credit or financial institutions operating in at least six Member States (section 2)
Regulation (EU) 2023/1113 (“TFR”)Information accompanying transfers of funds and crypto-assets (“travel rule”).Already applicable since December 30, 2024

1. Entities in scope

The AMLR applies to all obliged entities, whether or not they operate in the crypto sector. The list is set out in Article 3, supplemented for the financial sector by the definition of financial institution (Art. 2(1)(6) AMLR):

CategoryEntities coveredDetails
Credit institutionsBanks, including branches of third-country institutions located in the Union.Art. 3(1); branches: Art. 2(1)(5)
Financial institutionsPayment and electronic money institutions, currency exchange offices, investment firms, UCITS and AIFs and their managers, life insurance undertakings and intermediaries, lenders, central securities depositories, crypto-asset service providers (“CASPs“).Art. 2(1)(6).
Not covered: account information services[2]; advice on crypto-assets, which is excluded from the definition of crypto-asset services.[3]
CrowdfundingCrowdfunding service providers and intermediaries.Art. 3(3)(h)
Accounting and legal professionsAuditors, external accountants, tax advisors; notaries and lawyers when they take part in certain transactions (real estate, sale of businesses, management of client funds or crypto-assets, company formation); trust or company service providers, i.e., professionals who form companies, provide a registered office or business address, or act on behalf of third parties as directors, shareholders or trustees.Art. 3(3)(a) to (c)
Other professionsReal estate agents (including rentals of EUR 10,000 or more per month), traders in precious metals and high-value goods, traders in cultural goods and intermediaries in that trade, including art galleries and auction houses, for transactions of at least EUR 10,000, gambling services, credit intermediaries, football clubs and agents.Art. 3(3)(d) to (o)

Note: certain entities currently subject to AML/CFT rules under French law are not listed as such at European level, for example financial investment advisors (conseillers en investissements financiers). Whether they remain in scope will depend on the choice of the French legislator, which may extend all or part of the AMLR to other sectors under a notification procedure with the European Commission (Art. 3 AMLD6). This point has not been settled to date.

Measures and entities concerned

MeasureEntities concerned
General rules: internal organization, risk assessment, due diligence, beneficial ownership, suspicious transaction reportingAll obliged entities
EUR 10,000 cap on cash payments for goods or services (Art. 80)Any person selling goods or providing services
Travel rule (TFR)Payment service providers and CASPs
Cross-border correspondent relationships (Art. 36)Credit institutions and financial institutions
Crypto-asset specific rules (Art. 37, 40 and 79)CASPs
Eligibility for direct supervision by AMLACredit institutions and financial institutions, including CASPs, operating in at least six Member States

2. Supervision

  • General rule: national supervision. For the vast majority of entities, supervision remains at national level: in France, by the ACPR or the AMF depending on the entity’s status, or by the competent authority or professional body for non-financial professions. AMLA harmonizes these supervisors’ methods and assesses their quality.
  • Exception: direct supervision by AMLA of the largest financial players. Eligible entities are credit and financial institutions operating “in at least six Member States, including the home Member State” (Art. 12(1) AMLAR). AMLA will select up to 40 of them, based on their risk level, for direct supervision from 2028; the selection takes place in the second half of 2027 and will be renewed every three years (AMLA, Explainer, January 2026).

Note: activity carried out under the freedom to provide services may count toward the six-Member State threshold. For activity carried out under the freedom to provide services, the draft technical standards treat a Member State as relevant where more than 20,000 customers reside there, or where annual transactions exceed EUR 50 million. This draft has not yet been adopted.

3. Main changes to obligations

TopicChangeSource
GovernanceAppointment of a member of the management body responsible for AML/CFT compliance and of a compliance officer appointed by management; at least annual reporting. The two roles may be combined where size and risk justify it.Art. 11 AMLR
Risk assessmentAssessment that is “documented, kept up-to-date and regularly reviewed“, approved by management, including the risk of evasion of targeted financial sanctions; prior assessment of any new product, service or channel.Art. 10 AMLR
Customer due diligenceInformation to be collected harmonized at European level, for simplified, standard and enhanced due diligence; common rules for occasional and linked transactions.Art. 19 to 28 AMLR (Chapter III, Section 1); draft technical standards (Sept. 30, 2026)
Remote onboardingIdentity verification through an identity document or through electronic identification means compliant with the eIDAS Regulation and qualified trust services.Art. 22(6) AMLR
Updating customer filesAt least every year for high-risk customers, every five years for others, and upon any relevant event.Art. 26 AMLR
Beneficial ownershipThreshold of at least 25% maintained; detailed rules for ownership chains and control (Art. 51 to 55); reporting of discrepancies to the register (Art. 24).Art. 24 and 51 to 55 AMLR
OutsourcingPermitted, with the entity remaining fully liable; certain tasks cannot be entrusted to a third party.Art. 18 AMLR

Additional rules for CASPs

  • Occasional transactions: full due diligence from EUR 1,000; below that amount, at least identification and verification of the customer (Art. 19(3) AMLR).
  • Self-hosted addresses: assessment and mitigation of the risks of transfers “directed to or originating from a self-hosted address” (Art. 40 AMLR).
  • Anonymity: prohibition of anonymous accounts, including accounts allowing anonymization including through anonymity-enhancing coins (Art. 79 AMLR).
  • Correspondent relationships: enhanced measures for relationships with third-country CASPs (Art. 37 AMLR).

The implementing texts are not yet final. The technical standards on due diligence have been submitted to the European Commission, which may amend them; other AMLA guidelines are still under consultation (AMLA, regulatory instruments). Procedures adopted before their adoption may need to be revised.

4. Timeline

  • Until July 10, 2027, the current rules of the French Monetary and Financial Code continue to apply (Art. 90 AMLR).
  • From that date, obliged entities must have an AMLR-compliant framework in place, adopted by their management and operationally implemented.
  • The travel rule has already applied to payment service providers and CASPs since December 30, 2024.

As an indication, an upgrade is generally organized in the following stages:

PeriodPreparation steps
End of 2026Gap analysis between the existing framework and the AMLR.
Q1 2027Drafting of new procedures; adaptation of customer due diligence, screening and transaction monitoring tools.
Q2 2027Integration of the adopted technical standards; staff training; appointments under Article 11.
Before July 10, 2027Adoption by the management body and operational implementation.
After July 10, 2027Updating of existing customer files within the time limits set by Article 26.

Note: for credit or financial institutions operating in six or more Member States, the data used to select the entities to be supervised by AMLA will be collected as early as the first quarter of 2027.

In summary

The new framework covers all professionals subject to AML/CFT rules, with CASPs also subject to specific rules.

It applies from July 10, 2027, the date by which obliged entities must have a compliant framework in place.

Disclaimer

This note is a general information note prepared by d&a partners. It does not constitute legal advice, does not take into account the particular situation of any reader and may not serve as the basis for any decision without an individual analysis, which may be the subject of a separate engagement. It outlines Regulations (EU) 2024/1624 and 2024/1620 and Directive (EU) 2024/1640, solely in light of European Union law and French law, to the exclusion of any other law. It does not address the sector-specific regimes applicable to the entities mentioned, nor tax matters. It is prepared as of October 19, 2026, while several implementing texts and the French transposition measures have not yet been adopted. Its content is subject to change and d&a partners is under no obligation to update it. No one may rely on it against d&a partners. It may not be reproduced or disclosed to third parties without the prior written consent of d&a partners.


[1] In France, the bill on various provisions adapting French law to European Union law authorizes the Government to transpose AMLD6 by ordinance. It is under review as of the date of this note.

[2] Art. 2(1)(6)(a) AMLR, which covers the activities listed in Annex I to Directive 2013/36/EU “with the exception of the activities referred to in point 8 of Annex I to Directive (EU) 2015/2366“, i.e., account information services.

[3] The definition of crypto-asset services used in the AMLR excludes the provision of advice on crypto-assets referred to in Art. 3(1)(16)(h) of Regulation (EU) 2023/1114 (MiCA). A CASP that provides other crypto-asset services remains subject to the rules in respect of those services.

Crypto-asset influencers: seven pitfalls to avoid

In this article, Margaux FRISQUE, Partner, and Joseph BOHBOT, Senior Associate at the law firm d&a partners, analyze the main points of attention and best practices for discussing crypto-assets online and on social media.

Are you an influencer, platform, agency or advertiser looking to secure a campaign or an affiliate program? The firm d&a partners can assist you in analyzing the program, the content and the liabilities incurred, so that you can communicate with complete peace of mind.

Can an affiliate or referral link, a promo code, a copy trading video or a subscription presented as free give rise to the liability of a crypto influencer (or “finfluencer”)? Yes.

The law of June 9, 20231, known as the “influencers law” or the Delaporte-Vojetta law, regulated commercial influence by electronic means. It targets persons who use their notoriety with an audience, in return for consideration, in order to directly or indirectly promote a good, a service or a cause. The notion of consideration is interpreted broadly and may result, in particular, from an affiliate commission, a benefit in kind or any profit derived from the promotion.

In the world of crypto-assets, the risk does not depend solely on the project or platform being promoted; it may also stem from the way the post is presented, the path users are required to follow, or the content offered after the post.

First pitfall: forgetting that an affiliate link or referral code can be advertising

An influencer does not need to receive a transfer directly from the platform to fall within the commercial influence regime. Remuneration calculated according to the number of clicks, sign-ups or transactions may suffice. The same applies when an economic benefit is obtained indirectly, notably through an affiliate or referral program.

The question to ask is simple: does the influencer derive an economic benefit from promoting the service or the crypto-asset? If the answer is yes, the content cannot be treated as a mere personal opinion.

Posting the link in a YouTube or TikTok video, an Instagram story, a post on X, a description, a bio or a private Telegram or Discord group does not necessarily change its nature. A presentation that encourages an audience to open an account, use a platform or buy a crypto-asset may constitute direct or indirect promotion.

Second pitfall: concealing the commercial intent – the mandatory “advertising” label

The label “advertising” or “commercial collaboration” is not a secondary formality. The absence of a clear, legible and understandable indication of commercial intent constitutes a misleading commercial practice where that intent is not already apparent from the context.

The label must be immediately identifiable by the public. An indication buried at the end of a description, placed after several hashtags or accessible only after several clicks may be insufficient depending on the circumstances.

A general statement on the influencer’s channel or in their bio does not necessarily cover all posts. Each piece of content must be analyzed separately.

Third pitfall: presenting a crypto platform as authorized without checking its MiCA authorization (CASP)

Promoting a crypto platform is not just a matter of checking that its website works. You must also verify the services actually offered, the legal entity concerned and the authorizations it holds to target French or European customers.

The French Consumer Code classifies as a practice deemed misleading the act of claiming that a professional, product or service has been approved, endorsed or authorized when this is not the case. The same applies when the communication gives the impression that a service is lawful when it is not.

Consulting the lists published by the AMF (list of authorized CASPs, blacklists of unauthorized websites) is therefore an essential reflex, but it is not sufficient on its own. The analysis must cover the promoted entity, the targeted territory and the service offered. This point is all the more sensitive since, as of July 1, 2026 and the end of the MiCA transitional period, mere DASP (PSAN) registration is no longer sufficient: only crypto-asset service providers (CASPs) authorized under MiCA, by the AMF or by the authority of another Member State via the European passport, may provide their services in France.

Fourth pitfall: believing that anything goes as long as the platform is well known – crypto promotion and the MiCA regulation

The law of June 9, 2023 prohibits, in principle, the direct or indirect promotion of the provision of crypto-asset services. An exception applies where the advertiser is approved or authorized in accordance with the European MiCA regulation (Markets in Crypto-Assets, Regulation (EU) 2023/1114). The promotion of crypto-assets is also subject to specific conditions.

This exception does not mean that a well-known platform can be promoted freely. It requires verifying the entity contracting with the influencer, the services covered by its authorization and the exact nature of the campaign.

An authorization granted to one entity of a group does not necessarily allow all of the group’s activities to be presented as authorized. An authorization limited to certain services does not automatically cover all crypto-asset services.

Sweeping statements such as “regulated platform” or “risk-free platform” should also be avoided. A communication may be misleading when it gives an exaggerated impression of the security, scope or extent of an authorization.

Fifth pitfall: presenting as free a service that requires something in return (signals, training, bonuses)

The Consumer Code prohibits presenting a product or service as “free”, “at no cost” or equivalent when the consumer must pay anything other than the unavoidable costs of responding to the commercial practice or taking possession of the product.

The issue is not limited to paying a sum of money: access presented as free may be problematic when it requires opening an account with a platform, using an affiliate link, subscribing to a service (trading signals group, training course), providing data, or completing a step that generates remuneration for the influencer.

Sixth pitfall: crossing the line between content and crypto-asset services – investment advice and copy trading

Talking about crypto-assets does not automatically amount to providing a crypto-asset service. However, the risk increases when the influencer no longer limits themselves to commenting on the news or sharing general analysis.

Personalized recommendations may raise different questions. The analysis must notably consider the degree of personalization of the content and whether instructions are given to the user.

An influencer who personally uses a service is not in the same situation as one who invites their audience to open an account, replicate their trades or automatically follow their transactions (copy trading). In the latter case, the content may be analyzed as the promotion of a crypto-asset service and, depending on the specific arrangements, raise issues relating to the provision of advice on crypto-assets or portfolio management.

Seventh pitfall: thinking the risk is limited to having a post removed – the penalties incurred

Failure to comply with the applicable framework may expose the influencer to several types of consequences: content removal, delisting, injunctions, administrative penalties (notably imposed by the DGCCRF), contractual liability or criminal prosecution.

The misleading commercial practices referred to in Articles L. 121-2 to L. 121-4 of the Consumer Code are punishable by two years’ imprisonment and a fine of €300,000. The fine may also be increased, in proportion to the benefits derived from the offense, to 10% of average annual turnover, or to 50% of the expenses incurred in committing the offense. Where the offense is committed through an online public communication service or a digital medium, the penalties may be increased to five years’ imprisonment and a fine of €750,000.

Convicted individuals also face an additional penalty of being banned from working as an influencer for up to five years.

Liability may also extend to the advertiser and the influencer’s agent.

The right questions to ask before each post: the crypto influencer’s checklist

Before publishing content, a crypto influencer should be able to answer several questions.

Is the post directly or indirectly remunerated? Is its commercial nature immediately and clearly apparent? Is the promoted entity precisely identified? Are the services offered authorized for the targeted territory and audience? Does the content include a consideration or access condition that contradicts the advertised free nature? Is the post limited to general information, or does it encourage users to open an account, invest, copy a strategy or follow a personalized recommendation? Has the influencer obtained the ARPP Responsible Influence Certificate, whose finance module is recommended by the AMF?

This is not about applying an automatic formula. The same content may be lawful in one context and problematic in another, depending on the remuneration, the targeted audience, the platform concerned, the wording used and the path offered to users.

  1. Law No. 2023-451 of June 9, 2023 aimed at regulating commercial influence and combating abuses by influencers on social media. ↩︎